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A Victim’s Right to Confer Under the Crime
Victim’s Rights Act
ABSTRACT
The federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA) grants a victim the right
to confer with the United States attorney serving on his or her case.
However, in practice, the attorney’s criminal charging decisions can
impede the victim’s access to this right. This Comment analyzes a crime
victim’s right to confer in light of the recent In re Wild case, in which a
survivor of Jeffery Epstein’s alleged sex-trafficking crimes was effectively
denied the right to confer with the government attorney on her case because
criminal charges were never filed. This Comment advocates for an
interpretation of the CVRA that allows a victim to confer with the attorney
irrespective of the filing of criminal charges, in accordance with In re
Wild’s dissenting opinion.
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INTRODUCTION
Billionaire Jeffery Epstein sexually abused hundreds of young women,
including Ms. Courtney Wild.1 Now, over ten years later, Ms. Wild believes
that, in addition to enduring Epstein’s abuse, the criminal justice system has
also abused her.2 In short, federal prosecutors effectively denied Ms. Wild
her right to confer with them under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA)
when they executed a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with Epstein for
sexual abuse and trafficking charges without first informing Ms. Wild.3
Congress passed the CVRA in 2004 with the aim of promoting crime
victims’ participation in the criminal justice process.4 The CVRA outlines
a series of ten rights explicitly afforded to victims of federal crimes.5 One
of these rights is the “reasonable right to confer” with the government
attorney handling the case.6 But considerable debate exists regarding the
scope of that conferral right. Specifically, courts disagree about when the
right attaches and what exactly a victim has the right to confer about.7 In
order to uphold the purpose of the CVRA and promote victim participation
in the criminal justice process, courts should construe a victim’s right to
confer to apply before the government files criminal charges, and Congress
should amend the language of the CVRA to specify the conferral right’s
scope. These recommendations will ensure a victim’s “reasonable right to
confer” is upheld in the absence of a filed, formal charging document.
One article and one student-written comment have been published in
the last ten years on this subject, but both pre-date the panel majority
opinion in In re Wild.8 While this Comment, like previous writings, takes
1. Radical Media, Jeffrey Epstein: Filthy Rich, NETFLIX (May 27, 2020),
https://www.radicalmedia.com/work/jeffrey-epstein-filthy-rich [https://perma.cc/6V4L-MJ
ZT].
2. Id.
3. In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1198–1200 (11th Cir. 2020), vacated, 967 F.3d 1285
(2020).
4. Id. at 1227 (Hull, J., dissenting) (“[T]he CVRA was enacted to protect crime
victim’s rights and ensure their involvement in the criminal justice process.” (citations
omitted)).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2018).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5) (2018).
7. Compare In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1204–05 (majority opinion), with In re Wild, 955
F.3d at 1223–50 (Hull, J., dissenting), and In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008).
8. Elliot Smith, Comment, Is There a Pre-Charge Conferral Right in the CVRA?, 2010
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 407, 428 (2010) (advocating for a construction of the conferral right which
allows a victim to express his or her views to the prosecutor irrespective of the timing of plea
or non-prosecution agreement negotiations); Paul G. Cassell et al., Crime Victims’ Rights
During Criminal Investigations? Applying the Crime Victims’ Rights Act Before Criminal
Charges Are Filed, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 75 (2014) (focusing on rebutting the
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the position that a victim’s “reasonable right to confer” under the CVRA9
should be construed to apply before criminal charges are filed, this
Comment proposes amended language regarding a victim’s right to confer
that aligns with the CVRA’s intended purpose. This Comment also
considers how the In re Wild decision has impacted the debate surrounding
the scope of the CVRA.
Part I of this Comment begins with background information on the
CVRA and In re Wild case. Part II focuses on scope interpretations of a
victim’s right to confer under the CVRA, including both when the right
attaches and the object of conferral. Part III includes a brief policy
discussion about the importance of the conferral right. Part IV outlines a
proposed solution to misconstruing the timing and scope of the conferral
right, including sample language to clarify the scope of the right within the
CVRA’s text. Part IV also includes counterarguments to a pre-charge
conferral right before the Comment concludes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Crime Victims’ Rights Act
Statutorily codified victim rights were largely limited to state
constitutions prior to 2004.10 In the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that, when a citizen is not prosecuted or threatened with
prosecution, he or she does not have standing to contest prosecutorial
policies, but the Court acknowledged that Congress could provide such
standing by enacting statutes creating legal rights for victims.11 In 2004,
Congress capitalized on that suggestion and passed the CVRA. 12
For the six years immediately following the CVRA’s passage, the
number of identified victims of federal crimes increased by 298%,13
highlighting the CVRA’s significant impact on both identifying crime
Office of Legal Counsel’s guidelines regarding a post-charge conferral right under the
CVRA, using a previous case filed on behalf of other Epstein victims).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5).
10. See Robin Turner, Examination of Victim Rights: Ensuring Safety and Participation
in Court Process, 40 MONT. LAW. 18, 18 (2015).
11. Id.; Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617–18 (1973).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3771.
13. Turner, supra note 10, at 18 (“[T]he number of identified victims in federal cases
has more than tripled since the CVRA passed, increasing from 554,654 victims in 2004 to
2.2 million victims in 2010, a 298 percent increase. Victim notifications doubled to 5.7
million notices within one year of CVRA’s passage in 2004 and totaled nearly 8 million in
2010.” (citation omitted)).
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victims and affording them participation in the criminal justice process. The
CVRA’s primary drafter, Senator Jon Kyl, expressed his intention to
“correct, not continue, the legacy of the poor treatment of crime victims in
the criminal process.”14 The CVRA was ultimately intended to enlarge, not
limit, a crime victim’s rights.15
Under the CVRA, a crime victim is afforded the following rights:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court
proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release
or escape of the accused.
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding,
unless the court . . . determines that testimony by the victim would be
materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding.
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district
court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in
the case.
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s
dignity and privacy.
(9) The right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or
deferred prosecution agreement.
(10) The right to be informed of the rights under this section and the services
described in section 503(c) of the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of
1990 . . . .16

The CVRA defines “crime victim” as “a person directly and
proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense.”17
Other key terms such as “crime,” “reasonable,” and “confer” are left
undefined in the CVRA’s text.18 This Comment exclusively focuses on a
victim’s “reasonable right to confer.”19
14. 150 CONG. REC. S10911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“It is not
the intent of [the CVRA] that its significance be whittled down or marginalized by the courts
or the executive branch.”).
15. Id.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a).
17. § 3771(e)(2)(A).
18. § 3771.
19. § 3771(a)(5).
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Courts have adopted various constructions of the conferral right’s
intended scope.20 In her In re Wild dissent, Judge Hull defined “confer” as
to “speak with,”21 while the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals equated conferral
with meaningful communication.22 Although these definitions vary slightly
in substance, all of the interpretations confirm that in order to confer, at least
two parties must communicate. In the context of In re Wild, it is undisputed
that the parties to the conferral at issue are the victim, Ms. Wild, and the
team of government attorneys on her case. However, debate exists with
respect to when the conferral right’s trigger during the prosecutorial process
and what the parties are intended to confer about. The In re Wild panel
majority opinion describes the case’s facts as “beyond scandalous” and a
“national disgrace.”23 These facts provide a shocking framework to analyze
the disputed scope of a victim’s right to confer.
From 1999 to 2008, billionaire Jeffrey Epstein paid his associates to
recruit girls and women, some as young as fourteen, to travel to his
properties and suffer sexual assault by either Epstein or his friends.24 The
panel majority found at least thirty underage girls were harmed in this
arrangement,25 but other sources estimate “hundreds” of victims.26 After
sexually abusing these girls and women, Epstein compensated his victims
in exchange for their vows to recruit other young women into his
sexual-abuse scheme.27 Many of the victims were from low-income
families living in Epstein’s home community of Palm Beach, Florida.28
In 2005, the Palm Beach Police Department and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) began a two-year investigation into Epstein’s conduct.29
Two years later, the investigators referred the matter to the United States
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida for prosecution, and
a team of government attorneys began an eight-month period of
20. Compare In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (11th Cir. 2020), vacated, 967 F.3d
1285 (2020) (majority opinion) (advocating the CVRA conferral right attaches after criminal
proceedings are initiated by the filing of criminal charges), with In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196,
1223–50 (Hull, J., dissenting), and In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008) (interpreting the
conferral right to apply irrespective of the filing of criminal charges).
21. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1247 (Hull, J., dissenting). Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“confer” as “to consult with one another.” Confer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
22. In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 395.
23. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1198 (majority opinion).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Radical Media, supra note 1.
27. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1198.
28. Radical Media, supra note 1.
29. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1198.
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negotiations with Epstein’s team of defense attorneys.30 Approximately
five months later, more than two years after initiating the investigation into
Epstein’s allegations, federal prosecutors filed an eighty-two page
prosecution memo and a fifty-three page draft indictment with Epstein’s
extensive sex crime allegations.31
Epstein’s counsel and federal prosecutors then exchanged multiple
drafts of an NPA32; the final agreement granted Epstein—and his
co-conspirators—immunity from federal prosecution if he pleaded guilty to
two state level prostitution offenses.33 Epstein pleaded guilty to state
prostitution charges in June 2004, and the court sentenced him to eighteen
months’ imprisonment, twelve months’ home confinement, and lifetime
sex-offender status.34
During NPA negotiations, federal prosecutors issued letters to
Epstein’s known victims outlining each of their rights under the CVRA,
including each of the victims’ reasonable right to confer with the
Government’s attorneys.35 Further, after Ms. Wild filed a civil action
seeking enforcement of her rights under the CVRA, the district court found
this letter did not include information regarding the NPA; Epstein’s known
victims were never informed of the NPA or even informed that an NPA was
under consideration.36 At Epstein’s request, prosecutors did not notify his
victims about the NPA regarding the federal charges for almost a year.37
Prosecutors also did not inform the alleged victims of the state charges until
after Epstein pleaded guilty and the charges were finalized.38
Ms. Wild then brought suit alleging violations of, among other CVRA
rights, her right to confer with the government attorneys.39 In 2011, the
district court held that federal prosecutors violated Ms. Wild’s right to
confer by entering into and executing an NPA without first conferring with
her and other known victims. But the court left open the issue of appropriate

30. Id. at 1198–99.
31. Id. at 1198.
32. A non-prosecution agreement (NPA) is a contractual arrangement between a United
States government agency and a company or an individual facing a criminal or civil
investigation documenting the agency’s decision to refrain from filing charges.
Non-Prosecution Agreement, WESTLAW PRACTICAL LAW GLOSSARY 9-608-6205 (2020).
33. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1198.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1200.
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remedies.40 Because Epstein’s death effectively mooted the unresolved
issue of remedies, the district court dismissed Ms. Wild’s case, which
prompted her to file a writ of mandamus with the Eleventh Circuit on the
issue of appropriate remedies for the CVRA violations.41 The Eleventh
Circuit ultimately reversed the district court’s finding and denied Ms.
Wild’s petition on the grounds that federal prosecutors did not violate her
right to confer under the CVRA.42 The court reasoned the right to confer
does not attach until criminal proceedings are initiated, and criminal
proceedings are only initiated by filing a criminal complaint, information,
or indictment.43 This ruling effectively gives government attorneys the right
to refuse to confer with crime victims within the Eleventh Circuit’s
jurisdiction until a formal charging document is filed. The panel majority’s
narrow interpretation of the right to confer compelled Ms. Wild to file a
petition for an en banc hearing; the Eleventh Circuit granted the petition on
August 7, 2020.44 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the panel
opinion, and the case is currently pending en banc review.45
The Eleventh Circuit’s panel majority opinion was accompanied by a
lone but scrupulous dissent. Judge Hull advocated that the “plain and
unambiguous text of the CVRA [did] not include [a] post-indictment
temporal restriction that the Majority add[ed] to the statute.”46 Judge Hull’s
dissent ultimately rested on the plain language of the statute, logic of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the conferral right in In re
Dean,47 and policy considerations surrounding a victim’s right to confer.48
II. INTERPRETATIONS OF RIGHT TO “REASONABLY CONFER”
In interpreting the scope of a victim’s right to confer, relevant
considerations include both when it attaches during the criminal justice
process and the specific object the conferral right concerns. Before

40. Id. at 1201.
41. Id. at 1202.
42. Id. at 1219. Although the petitioner’s remedy requests with respect to Epstein were
mooted by his death, the Eleventh Circuit majority determined the petitioner’s civil case
against the government with respect to her other requested remedies remained live. Id. at
1248 (Hull, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1219 (majority opinion).
44. In re Wild, 967 F.3d 1285, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020).
45. Id. The court heard oral arguments for the case on December 3, 2020.
46. In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1225 (11th Cir. 2020), vacated, 967 F.3d 1285 (2020)
(Hull, J., dissenting).
47. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008).
48. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1240 (Hull, J., dissenting).
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exploring scope interpretations, a brief background of the plea negotiations
process is helpful. Plea negotiations can occur at various times throughout
a case, including before criminal charges are filed. A federal prosecutor
first notifies an individual of his or her involvement in an alleged crime; the
individual can then retain a defense attorney, who negotiates a plea
agreement to the charges with the federal prosecutor.49 The prosecutor can
then file the charging document and plea agreement simultaneously,
effectively “closing” the case before it is ever formally “opened.”
A. When does the right attach?
In addition to the In re Wild panel majority, other executive branch
entities interpret the conferral right to attach only after criminal charges are
filed.50 Alternatively, other appellate courts and the CVRA’s primary
drafter, Senator Jon Kyl, support In re Wild’s dissenting opinion’s
interpretation that a victim’s conferral right attaches irrespective of filed
criminal charges against the defendant.51
1. Post-charge Interpretation
Primarily, the In re Wild panel majority determined the right to confer
with a government attorney is available to a victim only after the
commencement of legal proceedings.52 The panel majority interpreted the
commencement of legal proceedings to occur when a formal charging
document is filed.53 This post-charge interpretation of the CVRA conferral
right produced a shocking reality for Ms. Wild and Epstein’s other victims
because federal prosecutors never filed the drafted indictment of sexual
abuse and trafficking allegations.54 Because federal criminal charges were
not filed before Epstein executed the NPA, Ms. Wild never had a right to
confer with attorneys assigned to her case.55 Therefore, the eight-month
period in which prosecutors negotiated an NPA with Epstein’s lawyers
before any charges were filed fell outside the scope of Ms. Wild’s conferral
right.56 In effect, this sealed the NPA negotiations in secrecy, and Ms. Wild
49. Smith, supra note 8, at 436–37.
50. Availability of Rights Under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, 34 Op. O.L.C.
239, 239–40 (2010) [hereinafter Availability of Rights]; 28 C.F.R. § 45.10 (2019).
51. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1240 (Hull, J., dissenting); In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 391; 150
CONG. REC. S10911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
52. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1205 (majority opinion).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1198.
55. Id. at 1212.
56. Id.
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did not learn of the NPA until July 2008, long after the agreement was
executed.57
The panel majority grounded its interpretation of a post-charge
conferral right in the statute’s text and history.58 The CVRA includes no
explicit language of when the conferral right attaches; rather, the text only
affords victims the “reasonable right to confer” with the attorney on the
case.59 The panel majority analyzed text from other sections of the CVRA
outside of the specific conferral right provision, such as the use of the terms
“crime,” which denotes that a crime has in fact occurred, and “accused,”
which implies commencement of criminal proceedings.60 In the conferral
right provision, the panel majority interpreted a victim’s right to “confer
with the attorney for the Government in the case” to be an easily identifiable
attorney, or group of attorneys, to support its conclusion that criminal
proceedings must be initiated, and an attorney assigned, in order for a victim
to have a right to confer under the CVRA.61 Further, the panel majority
acknowledged the term “case” could refer to either a “judicial” or an
“investigative” case.62 It ultimately determined that a judicial case, which
ordinarily requires the initiation of legal proceedings, is “undoubtedly” the
“primary” construction of the word.63
The court’s historical support for its interpretation of a post-charge
conferral right is rooted in an assumption that at the time of the CVRA’s
passage, the legislature must have “indisputably” known about the Victims’
Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 (VRRA).64 The VRRA, unlike the
CVRA, explicitly concerns victim rights; the VRRA triggers victim rights
upon the “detection” of crime.65 Because the CVRA mimics some of the
VRRA’s specific language but excludes portions that “by their express
terms, plainly apply before criminal proceedings begin[,]” the panel
majority assumed the legislature did not intend for the CVRA to apply
pre-charge.66
Finally, the panel majority interpreted a post-charge conferral right in
the context of the executive branch’s exclusive power of prosecutorial

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1212.
18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5) (2018).
In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1206–07.
Id. at 1207–08 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1207.
Id.
Id. at 1214–15.
34 U.S.C. § 20141(a) (2018).
In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1214.
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discretion.67 The court acknowledged that allowing victims to access their
conferral right pre-charge would impair prosecutorial discretion
principles.68 It emphasized that a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute is
entirely “exclusive” and “absolute,”69 and that construction of a pre-charge
conferral right would “requir[e] . . . consultation with victims before raids,
warrant applications, arrests, witness interviews, lineups, and
interrogations . . . work[ing] an extraordinary expansion of an
already-extraordinary statute.”70
As noted in the text of the CVRA,71 the Department of Justice’s (DOJ)
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) promulgated regulations to afford certain
rights to victims.72 These regulations were codified separate from the
CVRA and also do not expressly address the issue of when a victim’s rights
attach in the course of the criminal justice process.73 In the wake of
litigation surrounding Epstein’s sexual-abuse allegations brought by Ms.
Wild and other like victims in 2010, the OLC issued an explanatory
memorandum addressing the threshold question of when a victim’s right to
confer attaches.74 The OLC determined that all victim rights under the
CVRA, including the reasonable right to confer, attach “from the time that
criminal proceedings are initiated (by complaint, information, or
indictment).”75 The memorandum was released shortly after Ms. Wild filed
her initial suit. The timing of the release prompted suspicion that the
government memorandum was “designed to justify what most people would
say is unjustifiable”76 because the OLC had never before released a public
comment on the timing of a victim’s right to confer. Media outlets
publicized that the memorandum justified a secret deal that allowed a
wealthy man and his associates to evade federal sex-trafficking charges.77
The In re Wild panel majority drew upon the OLC’s conclusion that victim

67. Id. at 1216–18.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1218 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)).
70. Id. at 1218.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(f)(1) (2018).
72. 28 C.F.R. § 45.10 (2019).
73. Id.
74. Availability of Rights, supra note 50, at 239, 247–53.
75. Id.
76. RJ Vogt, Victims’ Rights Suffer Blow in Epstein Case, LAW360 (Apr. 19, 2020, 8:02
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1265036/victims-rights-suffer-blow-in-epstein-case
[https://perma.cc/G3QY-GP3E].
77. Id.
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rights attach upon the filing of criminal proceedings against the defendant
to support its post-charge interpretation of the conferral right.78
Notably, by ruling that the CVRA conferral right attaches post-charge,
the panel majority contradicted Eleventh Circuit precedent from Frank v.
United States. Although the Frank court did not reach the merits of the
petitioner’s claim, the court opined that while the petitioner was not a
“crime victim” under the CVRA, a crime victim may assert CVRA rights,
including the right to confer, “even if there is no ongoing prosecution in
connection with the applicable crime.”79 The panel majority’s ruling in In
re Wild states that a victim does not have a right to confer with the
government attorney until criminal charges are filed, irrespective of an
“ongoing judicial proceeding.”80 Unfortunately, the panel majority did not
acknowledge or address this apparent contradiction of precedent in the In
re Wild opinion.
In short, the panel majority’s interpretation of a post-charge
application of a victim’s right to confer is primarily grounded in the absence
of any pre-charge language in the CVRA, as well as in executive guidance
regarding CVRA interpretation.
2. Pre-charge Interpretation by the In re Wild Dissent and the Fifth
Circuit
Alternatively, the conferral right can apply before the filing of a formal
charging document, or pre-charge. The dissenting opinion in In re Wild and
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a pre-charge interpretation
primarily by analyzing the CVRA’s text and purpose.81 Judge Hull’s
dissenting opinion looked to the statutory text and its plain meaning as a
starting point for determining when a victim’s conferral right attaches.82
Unlike the panel majority, which used external text to interpret the conferral
provision language, Judge Hull interpreted the conferral provision’s
exclusion of the phrases judicial proceeding and filing of a charging
document to indicate that the conferral right may attach pre-charge.83 Judge
Hull opined that if the CVRA’s drafters intended the conferral right to attach
only after charges are filed, the drafters would have explicitly stated so in

78. In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1213–14 n.20 (11th Cir.), vacated, 967 F.3d 1285 (2020).
79. Frank v. United States, 789 F. App’x 177, 179 (11th Cir. 2019).
80. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1207.
81. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1225 (Hull,
J., dissenting).
82. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1225 (Hull, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1236, 1242.
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the text of the statute itself.84 Therefore, the absence of temporal language
in the provision indicates the drafter’s intent to not place a time cap on the
conferral right during the criminal justice process.85
Further, should the language of the conferral right provision be deemed
ambiguous, and therefore not subject to a traditional, plain meaning
analysis, Judge Hull concluded a pre-charge conferral right aligns most
appropriately with the CVRA’s intended purpose—promoting victims’
participation in the criminal justice system.86 If the conferral right does not
apply to pre-charge proceedings, such as the plea and NPA negotiation
process, and charges are never filed, as in the Epstein case, victims are
completely deprived of any CVRA rights.87 This result is entirely out of
line with the purpose of the CVRA because it deprives victims of their legal
right to participate in discussions with prosecutors.88
Senator Jon Kyl announced the CVRA’s purpose in his statements on
the Senate floor at the time of the CVRA’s passage. Senator Kyl stated he
intended for a victim’s CVRA conferral right to encompass “any critical
stage or disposition of the case.”89 Although this language is not expressly
captured within the text of the CVRA, the primary drafter’s stated intention
at the time of the CVRA’s passage certainly provides context for
interpreting the CVRA’s enumerated words.90 Judge Hull interpreted the
investigative process, as well as negotiations for plea deals and NPAs, to be
critical stages of the case because both could be dispositive.91 Senator
Kyl’s statement clarifies that the conferral right was not intended to attach
only with the filing of criminal charges. Rather, a victim’s right to confer
applies during any critical stage of the criminal justice process in a
particular case.92
In re Wild’s dissenting opinion draws considerable support from the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion in In re Dean regarding a victim’s
right to confer “pre-indictment.”93 The In re Dean majority acknowledged
that a crime victim has a conferral right even if there is no ongoing
84. Id. at 1235–36.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1227.
87. Id. at 1224.
88. Id.
89. 150 CONG. REC. S10911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
90. Statements made by legislative sponsors should be afforded “substantial weight” in
statutory interpretation. Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564
(1976); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394–95 (1951).
91. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1237–39 (Hull, J., dissenting).
92. 150 CONG. REC. S10911.
93. In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 at 1243 (Hull, J., dissenting).
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prosecution in connection with the applicable crime.94 The majority
reasoned that “victims have a right to inform the plea negotiation process
by conferring with prosecutors before a plea agreement is reached.”95 In
dicta, the Fifth Circuit majority opined that by executing a plea agreement
without informing a crime victim or learning the victim’s views on the
agreement’s details, government attorneys would effectively violate a
victim’s right to confer.96 Because the victims in In re Dean were not found
to be “crime victims” under the CVRA, the district court dismissed the
victims’ claim without ruling on the issue of when the conferral right
attached.97 Much like the pre-filing plea agreement at issue in In re Dean,
in In re Wild, federal prosecutors prepared an extensive indictment and
executed an NPA for the potential sex crime charges with Epstein’s lawyers
without ever conferring with the known victims.98 Therefore, under the
Fifth Circuit majority’s reasoning, the federal prosecutors on the case in In
re Wild would have had a legal obligation to confer with the victims,
including Ms. Wild, even before prosecutorial decisions commenced.
Because federal prosecutors did not confer with Epstein’s victims until after
the NPA was executed, they violated Ms. Wild’s reasonable right to confer
under the CVRA.99
In addition, although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has not
addressed this threshold issue, a prosecutor in that circuit explained that
“keeping victims in the loop about a case, pre-charge, was standard
procedure,” which highlights that at least one other circuit follows the Fifth
Circuit’s pre-charge interpretation.100 The CVRA applies to federal
employees involved in the detection, investigation, and prosecution of
crime.101 The DOJ’s Justice Manual, which outlines the protocol for federal
entities engaged in the detection, investigation, and prosecution of crime,
contains a provision on the scope of the conferral right.102 The manual
directs federal prosecutors to “consider victims’ views about[] any proposed
or contemplated plea negotiations.”103 Due to client confidentiality
94. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008).
95. Id. at 395.
96. Id. at 394; In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1243 (Hull, J., dissenting).
97. See In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 393.
98. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1243 (Hull, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1225.
100. Vogt, supra note 76.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) (2018).
102. See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 6, 96 Stat.
1256 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512); U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-16.030
(2019).
103. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-16.030.
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concerns and the practicalities of the prosecutorial process, a victim’s
avenue to prosecution information is generally limited to communicating
with the prosecutors assigned to the case. The standards governing federal
prosecutors, as outlined in the Justice Manual, direct them to confer with
victims before resolving plea negotiations, which aligns with a pre-charge
interpretation of the CVRA’s reasonable right to confer.104
3. Pre-charge Interpretation by Legal Scholarship
Finally, legal scholarship suggests that the conferral right can attach
pre-charge, and as early as the criminal investigation process.105 Criminal
law professor Paul Cassell’s 2014 article asserted all CVRA rights,
including the right to confer, attach when (1) an employee of any
“department or agency of the United States engaged in the detection,
investigation, or prosecution of crime has substantial evidence that an
identifiable person has been directly and proximately harmed as a result of
the commission of a federal offense” and (2) the employee determines the
identifiable “person is a putative victim of that offense.”106
Cassell analyzed victim identification through the framework of the
government’s traditional process of identifying defendants to a particular
case.107 His article advocated that government attorneys should notify
putative victims to a potential crime in the same way that putative
defendants are notified of their suspect status within a federal case.108
Remarkably, nothing in the process of notifying a suspected defendant
warrants the filing of criminal charges.109 Cassell argued victim rights
should attach in the same manner—upon substantial evidence that the
putative victim has experienced harm through the commission of a federal
offense.110 Cassell’s interpretation carries particular weight in an In re Wild
analysis because his article includes a discussion of Does v. United States,
a federal district court case involving Epstein victims.111 Three months
before Epstein executed his NPA, Jane Doe Number One, an anonymous
victim of Epstein’s sexual abuse, received a letter from the United States
Attorney’s Office.112 The letter contained information that Ms. Doe was in

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Cassell et al., supra note 8, at 92.
Id.
Id. at 93.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Does v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
Cassell et al., supra note 8, at 97.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol43/iss3/9

14

Cook: A Victim's Right to Confer Under the Crime Victim's Rights Act

2021]

A VICTIM’S RIGHT TO CONFER

557

possession of a “number of rights,” including the right to confer with the
attorney on the case.113 Therefore, it was obvious to even the government
attorneys that the CVRA conferral right applied to Ms. Doe before the NPA
was executed and charges were filed.114 Professor Cassell pointed out that
only later, during litigation concerning Ms. Doe’s CVRA rights in the
Epstein case, did the government attorneys begin to advocate for the
position that the CVRA did not apply to Ms. Doe because criminal charges
were never filed.115 As Professor Cassell noted, the United States
Attorney’s Office’s decision to argue that the CVRA did not apply to Ms.
Doe reveals an internal inconsistency in how the CVRA is interpreted
within government agencies: the FBI assumed Ms. Doe’s right to confer
applied during the period in which the NPA was pending, but the United
States attorneys argued otherwise during litigation.
B. What does a victim have the right to confer about?
While the discussion in In re Wild centers on when the right to confer
attaches, a universal understanding of what a victim has the right to confer
about may clarify the timing of when the right attaches. For example, if
NPAs were universally deemed an adequate object of conferral, the
conferral right would be interpreted to apply pre-charge in every
jurisdiction, as by definition, NPAs occur before a prosecutor files criminal
charges.116
Primarily, by its plain language, the CVRA affords victims the right to
confer with the attorney on the case.117 This language narrows the scope of
the conferral right to involve matters between the victim and assigned
prosecutor.118 Because the conferral right exists between a victim and the
attorney handling the victim’s case, the conferral right logically affords
these parties the right to discuss the criminal allegations.119 Because the
victim and attorney can discuss the allegations relevant to the case, whether
criminal charges are pending or filed should not affect a victim’s right to
confer.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 32.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5) (2018).
118. § 3771(a)(5).
119. § 3771(a)(5); see also Oral Argument at 8:30, 9:10–9:17, In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196
(11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2020) (No. 19-13843), https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/oral-argumentrecordings?title=19-13843&field_oar_case_name_value=&field_oral_argument_date_valu
e%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=&field_oral_argument_date_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmo
nth%5D= [https://perma.cc/TVB5-LMTE].
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The definition of “prosecution” is another key consideration in
determining the scope of the conferral right. Specifically, if “prosecution”
includes drafting an indictment and negotiating plea deals and NPAs, as
Judge Hull advocated, then the conferral right should attach once those
activities have commenced.120 The Fifth Circuit explicitly includes the
“plea negotiation process” in its definition of prosecution, meaning the
conferral right applies to the entirety of the pre-charge plea negotiation
process.121 Alternatively, the panel majority defined “prosecution” as
existing upon the filing of a formal charging document,122 which the OLC
memorandum considers to be a complaint or indictment.123 According to
the panel majority’s interpretation, any procedure occurring pre-filing of a
complaint or indictment is not considered a part of the prosecutorial process
and is thus outside the scope of a crime victim’s right to confer.124
Ultimately, a universal interpretation of what types of activities are
considered part of the prosecutorial process could also clarify when a
victim’s right to confer attaches. If pre-charge plea deals and NPA
negotiations are considered a prosecutorial procedure, then a victim has a
right to confer about these activities irrespective of a filed charging
document.
III. IMPORTANCE OF RIGHT TO “REASONABLY CONFER”
Properly interpreting the scope of a victim’s conferral right under the
CVRA requires an understanding of the significance of the right itself. The
scope of a victim’s right to confer under the CVRA has received media
attention, as Epstein’s wealth and social status gave him notoriety even
before his death in 2019.125 The alleged victims’ experiences with Epstein,
including Ms. Wild’s, proved so dramatic that Netflix produced a
documentary on the subject.126 The documentary utilizes Epstein’s victims’
stories to illustrate some of the policy implications relevant to when a
victim’s right to confer attaches.127 For example, the panel majority’s ruling
120. In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1240 (11th Cir. 2020), vacated, 967 F.3d 1285 (2020)
(Hull, J., dissenting).
121. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2008).
122. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1212 (majority opinion).
123. Availability of Rights, supra note 50, at 244.
124. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1212.
125. Jeffrey Epstein: Financier Found Dead in New York Prison Cell, BBC NEWS (Aug.
10, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49306032 [https://perma.cc/T8DRU5BV].
126. Radical Media, supra note 1.
127. Id.
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in In re Wild swings justice in favor of wealthy or well-resourced
perpetrators who can afford to compensate a team of attorneys to negotiate
an NPA or other plea agreement deal on behalf of their clients before
criminal charges are filed.128 Contrary to the purpose of the CVRA, this
practice effectively leaves victims completely out of the criminal justice
process because if the attorney does not file criminal charges, a victim has
no right to confer with the attorney.129 Second, Ms. Wild’s feelings of abuse
at the hands of the criminal justice system130 highlight a lack of emotional
safety for crime victims, and if victims do not feel safe, they will be unable
to meaningfully participate in the criminal justice process.131
A victim’s right to confer is the only right afforded under the CVRA
that is potentially enforceable before the filing of criminal charges, so the
conferral right is a victim’s only avenue to exercising the entire set of rights
afforded in the CVRA in a particular case.132 Practically speaking, if a case
boasts both an identifiable victim and attorney, some harm or threat of harm
has warranted the commencement of a criminal investigation. If a
prosecutor drafts an indictment and proceeds to negotiate with the accused’s
defense attorneys without involving the victim, such as in In re Wild, the
victim has no legal rights within the prosecutorial process, even though the
victim is proximately harmed by the crime. Denying a victim the right to
confer with the government attorney during the plea deal negotiations or
NPA process effectively strips the victim of his or her participation in the
criminal justice system.
The criminal justice system exists, at least partly, to effectuate a sense
of justice on behalf of a victim, as the victim has been proximately harmed
by the commission of the crime. Thus, victim participation is critical to the
functioning of the criminal justice system.133 Victims can also be the most
effective witnesses in a criminal prosecution, as they can testify to the
events and consequences that actually occurred during the commission of
the offense.134 However, if victims are denied CVRA rights, and effectively
alienated from the criminal justice process, a sense of unfairness and

128. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1240 (Hull, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 1224.
130. Id.
131. Turner, supra note 10, at 18.
132. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1224–25 (Hull, J., dissenting).
133. OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES
FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE 7 (2005), https://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/ag_gui
delines.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP7N-RKFL].
134. Vogt, supra note 76.
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disrespect for the system is likely to result.135 This disrespect can translate
into a tendency to disregard law enforcement and prosecutorial authority,
particularly in high-crime communities.136
Further, when the criminal justice system is viewed as unfair, victims
will likely be dissuaded from participating in it; a crime victim treated
unfairly is less likely to report an incident or threat of harm in the future,
under the belief that the victim’s experience will not matter to the
prosecutorial process.137 Decreased victim reporting could have disastrous
societal consequences, as it increases the risk that the criminal will continue,
unencumbered by law enforcement, to harm the purported victim and other
people in the community, ultimately resulting in a lack of crime control.138
A victim’s diminished sense of trust in the criminal justice system is also
likely to have ripple effects in the broader community, particularly in cases
that involve a subject or topic of media interest.139 When victims cannot
participate in the criminal justice system, they are treated as objects, rather
than subjects, and thus become vulnerable to “infinite manipulation” by the
system itself.140
Finally, the conferral right is important with respect to including
community representation in the criminal justice process. Community
representation is important because community members are usually
proximately affected by criminal harm.141 Prosecutorial power includes the
authority to determine “the fate of defendants,” as the prosecutor wields
charging power, and over ninety percent of criminal cases are resolved
before a trial.142 Because the majority of criminal matters conclude without
a trial by a jury of peers, prosecutors’ impressions of criminal cases largely
shape the criminal justice system.143 Without jury trials insulating the
criminal justice process with community perspectives, government
attorneys often make prosecutorial decisions in a vacuum of their own
experience. A victim exercising his or her conferral right under the CVRA
allows the attorney to engage with a layperson’s firsthand perspective and
135. Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From Consultation to
Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 327 (2007).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 328.
138. Id. at 329.
139. Id. at 328.
140. Id. at 331.
141. Andrea Cipriano, ‘Old Boys Club’ of White, Male Prosecutors Facing Change:
Study, CRIME REP. (Oct. 24, 2019), https://thecrimereport.org/2019/10/24/white-mendominate-u-s-prosecutor-positions-says-study/ [https://perma.cc/ABM8-F7BJ].
142. Id.
143. Id.
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ensures a member of the community is represented in the criminal justice
process.
IV. SOLUTION
In order to effectuate the purpose of the CVRA and afford victims
involvement in the criminal justice system,144 courts should universally
adopt a broad construction of when the conferral right attaches. Congress
should amend the CVRA to include language explicitly stating that
negotiations for any resolution of the case are included in the scope of a
victim’s right to confer.
A. A Victim’s Right to Confer Should be Broadly Construed
First, courts, including the upcoming en banc panel for In re Wild,
should broadly construe a victim’s reasonable right to confer to apply
pre-charge; statutory interpretation, legislative purpose, and public policy
arguments all support this interpretation. Statutory interpretation begins
with ascertaining the plain meaning of the statutory text.145 The judiciary
should assume both the legislature’s inclusion and omission of particular
language in each statutory provision is an intentional choice.146 Here, the
conferral right’s text includes no reference to the timing of when the
conferral right attaches; thus, the courts should not insert one.147 Courts
should instead treat the legislature’s omission of a temporal limitation
within the text of the act as intentional, and capitalize on the textual
limitation that is included—”reasonable.”148 Outside of the conferral right
provision, the CVRA references certain rights that are only applicable in a
144. In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020), vacated, 967 F.3d 1285 (2020)
(Hull, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 1234; see Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (explaining that
“[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to
the language itself, [but as well by] the specific context in which that language is used, and
the broader context of the statute as a whole”).
146. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1236 (Hull, J., dissenting); United States v. St. Amour, 886
F.3d 1009, 1013 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1337–38
(11th Cir. 2002)); see Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (“[W]here
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . ,
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.”); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170 (2012) (“[W]here the document has used one
term in one place, and a materially different term in another, the presumption is that the
different term denoted a different idea.”).
147. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1236 (Hull, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1235.
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judicial hearing,149 which supports the argument that the absence of
language limiting a victim’s right to confer to the context of a judicial
proceeding was intentional.
Further, section 3771(c) of the CVRA applies to all federal agencies
“engaged in the detection, investigation or prosecution of crime.”150 Even
if plea and NPA negotiations are not included in the term “prosecution,” the
CVRA’s text applies to any federal agency involved in the crime detection
and investigation process.151 A crime that has not been detected cannot
logically be an object of plea or NPA negotiations.152 Therefore, if the
CVRA provisions explicitly apply to entities not engaged in prosecution, a
victim’s right to confer should logically exist irrespective of the filing of
prosecutorial charges. When viewed in the context of the CVRA’s
language, the absence of a temporal limitation in the conferral right
provision’s text contemplates the legislature’s pre-charge intention.153
The CVRA was enacted to effectuate the purpose of increasing victim
participation in the criminal justice system.154 In a case resolved pre-charge,
denying a victim his or her conferral right prevents his or her participation
in the criminal justice system, which is contrary to this purpose. Therefore,
when viewed through the CVRA’s purpose to ensure victim involvement in
the criminal justice process, the conferral right should be construed to apply
pre-charge in order to ensure it exists independent of a prosecutor’s decision
to file criminal charges.
Similarly, the Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness
Assistance direct DOJ officials to use best efforts to identify victims as soon
as possible after a crime occurs, as early as the commencement of a criminal
investigation.155 This instruction is intended to ensure that the federal
government assists crime victims to the fullest extent possible.156 A
direction to identify victims as soon as possible does not support a conferral
right only attaching after charges are filed. Rather, the DOJ has mandated
the opposite—that victims be involved from the outset of the
149. Id.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) (2018).
151. Id.
152. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1237 (Hull, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1235–37.
154. Id. at 1227 (Hull, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see Kenna v. U.S. District Court
(Walters), 435 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating “floor statements by the sponsors of
the legislation are given considerably more weight than floor statements by other
members.”); 150 CONG. REC. S10911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (Statement of Sen. Kyl).
155. OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 133; see also Cassell et al., supra note 8, at
77.
156. OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 133.
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investigation.157 These guidelines support victim participation as crucial to
the criminal justice process, and attorneys should not deny victims this
participation by violating their right to confer about the case.
Additionally, public policy objectives of both involving and protecting
crime victims during the criminal justice process support a pre-charge
interpretation of the conferral right. The Fifth Circuit states that the
CVRA’s passage demonstrates Congress’s policy decision that “victims
have a right to inform the plea negotiations process by conferring with
prosecutors before a plea agreement is reached.”158 A post-charge
interpretation of the conferral right makes the existence of victim rights
contingent upon a federal prosecutor’s decision to file a formal charging
document. This could enable prosecutors to bypass the victim’s lived
experience, who was proximately harmed as a result of the commission of
the offense.159 The harm or threat of harm a victim experienced as a result
of the commission of an offense exists independent of a prosecutor’s
decision to file criminal charges. Although a prosecutor can recommend
punishment for the accused, the prosecutor cannot eliminate the harm a
victim has suffered by filing a criminal charge. A post-charge conferral
interpretation effectively strips a victim of his or her agency and
participation in the criminal justice process.
Finally, in cases such as In re Wild, in which the accused can afford to
compensate a team of high-profile defense attorneys to negotiate a NPA
with federal prosecutors, a post-charge conferral interpretation steers justice
in favor of wealthy or well-resourced criminals.160 This result is particularly
concerning in light of the egregious level of harm Ms. Wild experienced
during years of sexual exploitation and abuse by Epstein.161 In a
post-charge jurisdiction, absent filing criminal charges, the victim’s
conferral right does not exist; this result leaves the victim without agency
in redressing the harm he or she suffered.162

157. Cassell et al., supra note 8, at 77.
158. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2008).
159. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1240, 1246 (Hull, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 1240.
161. See id. at 1198 (majority opinion) (“Despite our sympathy for Ms. Wild and others
like her, who suffered unspeakable horror at Epstein’s hands, only to be left in the dark—
and, so it seems, affirmatively misled—by government lawyers, we find ourselves
constrained to deny her petition.”).
162. Id. at 1224.
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B. Proposed Amendment Language to the CVRA Conferral Right
Provision
If courts refuse to construe the CVRA to apply pre-charge, then
Congress should amend the conferral right provision to specify the right’s
object. The CVRA’s purpose would be better served by adding certain
language from Ms. Wild’s proposed amendment specifying a right to confer
with the government attorney about any resolution of the case before the
resolution is finalized.
During oral arguments for In re Wild, Ms. Wild’s counsel
unsuccessfully advocated for the conferral right to attach when “an
investigation has ‘matured’ to the point where . . . prosecutors are
‘negotiating with defense attorneys and signing agreements.’”163 However,
the term “mature” may not ensure a victim’s right to confer is upheld during
pre-charge negotiations because if prosecutors can exclude victims from a
conversation about an NPA, as in In re Wild, it would allow prosecutors to
conveniently neglect a victim’s conferral right and couch their justification
in an “unmatured” prosecution.
Further, in 2019, Ms. Wild proposed a self-titled amendment to the
CVRA to deter future government attorneys from excluding victims as she
was. Her proposal includes amending section five of the CVRA by
replacing “Government in the case”164 with “the Government, including the
right to confer about any plea bargain or other resolution of the case before
such plea bargain or resolution is presented to the court or otherwise
finalized.”165 Therefore, the Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform
Act of 2019 contains two noteworthy items with respect to analyzing the
scope of a victim’s right to confer.
First, the proposed legislation replaces the “attorney for the
Government in the case”166 with “the Government[.]”167 This affords
victims a wide latitude of access to the government at large, rather than a
single attorney, and includes federal officials engaged in the detection and

163. Oral Argument at 8:30, 9:10–17, In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1211 (11th Cir. Dec. 3,
2020) (No.19-13843), https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings?title=1913843&field_oar_case_name_value=&field_oral_argument_date_value%5Bvalue%5D%5
Byear%5D=&field_oral_argument_date_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=
[https://perma.cc/TVB5-LMTE].
164. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5) (2018).
165. Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act of 2019, H.R. 4729, 116th Cong.
§ 2(1)(A) (2019).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5).
167. H.R. 4729.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol43/iss3/9

22

Cook: A Victim's Right to Confer Under the Crime Victim's Rights Act

2021]

A VICTIM’S RIGHT TO CONFER

565

investigation, not just the direct prosecution, of crime.168 As previously
discussed, the CVRA contains a reference to its applicability to other
executive departments engaged in the detection and investigation of crime,
but this reference is not codified in the same provision of the CVRA as the
conferral right.169 The placement of the provision applying the CVRA to
other governmental departments was a key point of contention between the
panel majority and dissenting opinions in In re Wild.170 However, including
an identifier as broad as “the Government” may actually increase a victim’s
difficulty in realizing his or her conferral right, as there is no readily
identifiable point of contact in the provision’s text. Especially regarding a
crime victim, who is presumably a recently harmed, vulnerable individual,
trying to determine whom exactly the victim should confer with may be
practically impossible. For example, a victim could not pick up the phone
and dial “the Government’s” number like he or she could “the attorney for
the Government in the case.”171
Second, the proposed amendment language in the Courtney Wild
Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act of 2019 also expands the scope of the
conferral right within the text of the CVRA. In the amendment, the right to
confer is retained with the language “including,” which implies the
conferral right exists in the same capacity as the original language but is
also expanded by words specifying a right to confer before any resolution
of the case is finalized.172 By including the language “resolution of the
case,” the proposed language ensures all possible avenues associated with
pre-charge proceedings would be included in a victim’s right to confer. By
allowing a victim the right to confer with the government before finalizing
any resolution of the case, the proposed amended language ensures the
victim will be informed prior to the decision-making process. Ultimately,
the CVRA should retain the words “government attorney on the case,” but
add language specifying a right to confer about any resolution of the case
before the resolution is finalized, in order to ensure victims are properly
afforded their CVRA rights.
C. Counterarguments to Broadly Construing a Victim’s Right to Confer
As unfortunate as a post-charge conferral right may be for victims,
there are at least three counterarguments for broadly construing a victim’s
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1).
169. Id.
170. In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 2020), vacated, 967 F.3d 1285 (2020)
(majority opinion); In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1237 (Hull, J., dissenting).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5).
172. H.R. 4729.
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“reasonable right to confer” in the CVRA.173 First, as the In re Wild panel
majority opines, a broad construction of a victim’s conferral right may not
fall within the plain meaning of the CVRA’s text.174 This purportedly
textualist approach follows the logic that the Crime Victims’ Rights Act
should attach upon commission of a crime, which traditionally exists upon
filing of a formal charging document.175 The panel majority notes that if
the conferral right was intended to apply pre-charge, Congress would not
have used language that contemplates post-charge proceedings, such as
“crime victim,” “accused,” and “case” in the statutory text.176 Although the
panel majority’s contentions are largely unfounded when viewed in light of
the statute’s intended purpose, the lack of a pre-charge specification in the
text of the conferral right provision will likely continue to pose statutory
interpretation issues regarding when the right to confer attaches if the
language is not clarified.177
Second, the panel majority notes that a broad construction of a victim’s
right to confer with an attorney before criminal charges are filed creates a
potential burden to the prosecutorial process but cites no evidence to support
this assertion.178 At present, jurisdictions construing a ”precharge conferral
right” do not include a right for victims in raids, warrant applications, and
other investigative procedures, and the panel majority failed to point to
empirical evidence that construing a victim’s conferral right to
apply precharge would not open such a floodgate.179
Further, construing the conferral right to apply pre-charge does not
change the substance of the right—the victim still has the right to confer
with the attorney on the case—it only influences the timing of when the
substantive right attaches. No substantive changes to the prosecutorial
process occur when a conferral right is applied before charges are filed.
Instead, the attorney simply notifies the victim before filing the charging
document as opposed to after.
Opponents of a broad construction may argue a pre-charge conferral
right could impact a defendant’s timely decision to accept a plea deal or
NPA. In this scenario, it is important to consider the purpose of the CVRA,
which is to afford rights to crime victims,180 not to enhance a prosecutor’s
173. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5).
174. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1205–06 (majority opinion).
175. Id. at 1212.
176. Id. at 1205–08.
177. Id. at 1205 (noting that contrary to the panel majority’s holding, the CVRA “could
be read to apply pre-charge”).
178. Id. at 1211, 1216.
179. See id. at 1244 (Hull, J., dissenting); In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2008).
180. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1227 (Hull, J., dissenting).
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ability to extract a speedy confession or signature in a plea deal with a
criminal defendant. The CVRA is primarily victim-centered, as evidenced
in its title, rather than prosecutor- or criminal-defendant-focused.
Third, both the panel majority and dissenting opinions in In re Wild
generally skirt the potential constitutional issue relevant to a pre-charge
conferral right.181 The Constitution grants the executive branch of
government the exclusive power of prosecutorial discretion182 and is
therefore relevant to discussing potential counterarguments to construing a
pre-charge conferral right. In short, prosecutorial discretion is traditionally
interpreted as the decision whether to prosecute.183 However, the word
“confer” does not equate to “decide.” Rather, conferral implies a discussion
with, not a decision made by, the victim.184 After conferring with the victim
regarding the relevant prosecution, plea, or non-prosecution options, the
government attorney retains absolute discretion as to whether or not to
prosecute the accused, irrespective of the victim’s opinion on the matter.185
The conferral right is simply an avenue for the victim to be informed on
what is happening with his or her case before it is resolved.
Further, in the text of the CVRA, the legislature codified an express
provision regarding an intention not to limit prosecutorial discretion by its
passage.186 Therefore, with respect to a pre-charge conferral right, the
potential constitutional concern is simply not at issue, and again, it is
important to consider the purpose of the CVRA, which is to codify
victims’—not prosecutors’—rights.187
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, to uphold the purpose of the CVRA and ensure a crime
victim’s participation in the criminal justice process,188 a victim’s right to
confer should be construed to apply pre-charge. The CVRA should be
amended with language specifying the scope of the conferral right to ensure
a victim’s “reasonable right to confer”189 is upheld in the absence of a filed
formal charging document. Specifically, the CVRA’s text should include
181. Id. at 1216–17 (majority opinion); id. at 1246–47 (Hull, J., dissenting).
182. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
183. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1247 (Hull, J., dissenting).
184. See In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 395.
185. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1247 (Hull, J., dissenting).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6) (2018).
187. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1227 (Hull, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1227 (quoting Kenna v. U.S. District Court (Walter), 435 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th
Cir. 2006)).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5).
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the right to confer “about any resolution of the case before such resolution
is presented to the court or otherwise finalized” in order to ensure the
pre-charge application of the conferral right is codified within the text of
the statute.
Several concerns exist with respect to the timing and scope of a
victim’s right to confer under the CVRA. At the upcoming en banc hearing,
all twelve judges on the Eleventh Circuit will rule on a crime victim’s right
to confer pre-charge. In this hearing, the Eleventh Circuit should ensure
victims are included in the criminal justice process by upholding their right
to confer with a government attorney irrespective of the filing of criminal
charges. Additionally, Ms. Wild’s proposed amendment language is in the
first of a lengthy, six-stage passage process, and a successful bill can take
years to pass. The low likelihood of the amendment’s imminent passage
increases the weight on the upcoming en banc decision.
Until the conferral right’s text is properly amended, or the issue is
before the United States Supreme Court, courts will likely continue to
construe the timing of the conferral right differently. Unfortunately, in
jurisdictions that do not construe the conferral right to attach pre-charge,
victims will continue to be excluded from the criminal justice process in
cases where criminal charges are never filed. This is likely to lead victims
to continue to feel abused by the criminal justice system, much like Ms.
Wild’s experience.190 This reality is particularly problematic in cases where
the accused evades criminal charges using his or her wealth and
connections. Denying a victim’s right to confer in these situations swings
justice in favor of wealthy or well-resourced criminals and away from the
victims who have been harmed.
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